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MANAGING SUSTAINABLE AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT 
Introduction 
Agricultural leaders in economies making transitions from planned to market systems have a 
double responsibility, First there is the complex task of restructuring the economic system to permit 
an increased role for markets in the allocation of resources and in the distribution of the benefits of 
economic activity, Second, they must respond to the increasing scientific information on the 
relationship of agriculture to the environment and to concerns about the capacity of agriculture to 
meet societal demands for food and other raw materials (and contribute to a landscape consistent with 
a high-quality life for rural and urban citizens) on a sustainable basis (see for example, Serageldin and 
Steer 1994), In both of these areas, much can be learned from the more mature market economies 
and the experience to date of the nations of the Former Soviet Union (FSU)(Brooks et aL 1991; Csaki 
1990, 1991; Csaki and Johnson 1993; Johnson and Brooks 1983; and McKinnon 1994), At the same 
time, the development of a market-based sustainable agriculture must reflect the unique historic and 
cultural features of these nations in transition as well as the specific capacities of the human and 
natural resources used by the agricultural production, processing and distribution system, 
Market systems have intrinsic features that are consistent with the sustainable development of 
agriculture, Goods and services are produced to meet consumer demand, The sovereignty of 
consumer decisions is more fully reflected in market demand, in contrast to the situation in planned 
systems where consumers may have free choice, but only indirectly influence the mix of goods 
produced by agriculture, From a societal viewpoint, the expression of consumers' preferences 
through markets implies that the agricultural system will produce from its scarce and perhaps frail 
resources a mix of goods and services with a higher value (in theory consistent with maximum 
welfare), In production, processing and distribution, market incentives lead to resource allocation 
efficiency through price incentives for both inputs and outputs, and more subtly, the consolidation of 
the productive agricultural resources or assets in the hands of the most able managers, The managers 
that are efficient make higher profits and, in turn, can use these profits to acquire land and other 
resources or other assets from the less efficient managers (Csaki and Johnson 1993), 
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Markets also work to achieve production and consumption efficiencies through allocations of goods 
and services in time and space. This feature of markets is of particular importance to agriculture, 
where the production cycle is annual or relatively long and distance from input suppliers and 
consumers is often a factor. 
Of course, markets are not perfect in their capacities to organize production and consumption. 
The inability of market prices to accurately reflect the full current and future value of today's 
resources provides a rationale for a small but important role for the government in agriculture and 
other industries. This role is different from the directing of production, processing, distribution, and, 
to an extent, consumption, that the government assumes in planned economic systems Instead, 
<>uccessful government provides a regulatory and institutional framework that minimizes the problems 
of market failure. Market failures occur in situations where there are externalities, information 
asymmetries, strategic collusion, and skewed income distributions. 
The hypothesis of this paper is that, for transition economies, sustainable development of 
agriculture can be most effectively achieved by aggressive steps to increase the role of markets in 
resource allocation and distribution. Using resources efficiently and producing the goods and services 
most highly valued by consumers can take agriculture a long way toward the goal of sustainable 
development In the transition, there are also opportunities not to repeat the mistakes in the 
development of agriculture of the more mature market economies. By careful consideration of 
property rights, systems of taxation and redistribution, and initiatives for choices of production, 
processing and distribution technologies, a more informed path to a sustainable agriculture can he 
identified (Lerman et a!. 1994). Leaders in transition economies have the difficult task of 
orchestrating the change of an economic system, but an unusual and perhaps one-time opportunity for 
achieving reforms in which economic growth, environmental protection, and sustainability of 
agriculture are mutually achieved. 
Elements of a Sustainable Development Strategy 
The specific strategies pursued by nations for achieving the sustainable development of 
agriculture will reflect the many complexities and the specific circumstances in which these initiatives 
are undertaken. It is not possible to lay-out a detailed prescription for change without the benefit of 
much more complete information on the political and economic climate, the initial conditions for 
agriculture, and the priorities that will emerge in efforts to define and implement sustainable 
development strategies. Still, for nations in transition, there are a few principles that will prove 
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useful in guiding these sustainable development strategies. These principles relate to sequencing, the 
nature of policy and institutional changes, and the pace implementation. Figure 1 provides an 
overview of these principles and their sequencing, nature, and timing or pace. 
The first priority for achieving sustainable development is the implementation of the reforms 
leading to a market-based agriculture. It is only after these reforms are consolidated that the structure 
of agriculture (broadly defined) that will emerge under the market system begins to become apparent. 
Legislative and political energies heavily devoted to legislation and regulation for environmental 
performance may be misplaced at this point in the transition. Clearly, the legal, regulatory and 
administrative structure, and the public sector activity necessary for achieving sustainability, depend 
the structure of agriculture; for example, production patterns, production technologies, concentration 
m processing and distribution, and institutions governing activities of special interest groups. Setting 
directive policies for environmental aspects of sustainability before the transition is well under way 
may result in improper incentive structures and unnecessary costs. The positioning of the regulatory, 
administrative, and legal structures is additionally complicated by the fact that market systems go 
hand-in-hand with more open economies. Thus, the resulting agriculture will reflect not only 
interregional competition, but the comparative advantage among nations 
Income will be highest when the most efficient market allocation of resources is achieved With 
these higher real incomes, it will become more feasible to consider the trade-offs between profits 
today and profits tomorrow that are implied by the production techniques that do not degrade nature 
and the natural resource base; that is, production technologies that foreclose future options for equal 
productive capacity. Among the mature market countries, we have observed that higher incomes 
correlate with added willingness to take care of nature and the resource base. 
Strategic Instruments 
Economic Reform 
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The high initial priority on economic reform does not mean, however, that there are not 
important and specific activities that can be undertaken to support the sustainable development of 
agriculture from an environmental perspective. In this area, a number of public sector activities can 
contribute to the sustainable development of agriculture, and lay the groundwork for more specific 
and directive initiatives, once there is better information about the structure of agriculture that will 
evolve under the new market system. These activities include: 
• Information needs to be developed on the attitudes of the practitioners in agriculture, and in 
the general population, about environment and sustainability; what they know about issues of 
sustainability, and where they obtain the information that influences their attitudes and 
behaviors. In more mature market economies, surveys providing this information have been 
particularly revealing. In most cases, these surveys have found, for example, those involved 
in agriculture tend to be much more interested and sensitive to sustainability and the 
maintenance of the resource base for continued growth and productivity than was imagined 
by the environmental interest groups. The implication is that a less stringent regulatory and 
administrative framework may be most appropriate. Without knowledge of the producer's 
preferences in favor of preserving the environment, the government may overreact and 
overrestrict. The resulting lower output and income can undermine the incentives that would 
otherwise be there among high-income producers to demand high levels of environmental 
protection and sustainability. 
• The assembly of information about impacts of agricultural production, processing, and 
distribution practices on indicators of environmental performance and sustainability is 
necessary. Sound information on relationships of cultivation practices, rates, fertilizer and 
pesticide application, and other cropping practices for ground and surface water, soil tilth, 
erosion, and related indicators of the capacity to develop a productive agriculture must be 
available to support education and intervention initiatives. The same is true for the livesrock 
and other subsectors. Added monitoring, data acquisition, and management activities can 
begin in conjunction with an acceleration of market reform in agriculture. 
• Public education will be critical to sustainable development of agriculture, both during and 
after full implementation of market reforms. Perhaps in transition economies, due to the new 
and inexperienced private farmers and other agents in agriculture, these programs are even 
more essential than in established market economies. Education programs can provide 
information to improve productivity and reduce the negative impacts of current agriculture on 
the environment. In many cases, more sustainable agriculture practices are consistent with 
increased profits, such as, inputs used more efficiently. Well-informed economic agents will 
produce a more environmentally sound and sustainable agriculture. 
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• Pilot and demonstration activities, featuring new technologies, farming systems, and multi-
farm environmental management approaches can be introduced. These can include, for 
example, limited tillage cultivation, improved management of livestock waste, landscape and 
watershed management, crop rotations, and many others. The scientific basis for many such 
demonstrations is available in the respective nations and can be supplemented by experiences 
in nations that are currently more aggressively pursuing the sustainable development of 
agriculture. 
• Research and formal educational systems can be reoriented. New ideas, techniques, and 
management methods are critical to the sustainable agricultural development. Research and 
educational programs that deal with sustainable development and improved management in 
the agriculture require longer term investment and attention. Recently, for example, the 
technology curve for sustainable agriculture has been rapidly pushedout by more 
environmentally oriented programs in the developed mature market economies. Future 
agricultural technologies and management methods and, in fact, the human capital for 
agriculture ultimately depend on solid and up-to-date research and formal education systems. 
• Tuning of taxation, subsidy, and other forms of current government intervention in 
agriculture can, of course, support sustainability. Many of the existing government 
interventions and public sector activities in agriculture are likely to be at cross-purposes with 
sustainable development. Inventorying and evaluating these interventions and activities for 
their implications during the evolution to a market system can yield information to support 
the sustainable development of agriculture. In many cases, minor changes in taxation and 
subsidy schemes or current regulations and administrative practices can result in significant 
improvements in the productivity of agriculture and reduce the negative impacts of 
agriculture for the human and natural resource base. 
This evaluation of the regulatory, administrative and legal structures, as well as other public 
sector activities in agriculture, should be ongoing during the process of economic reform. Activity in 
this area can help prepare policymakers for the formulation and implementation of a more coherent 
policy for sustainable development that is geared to the emerging structure of agriculture. A feature 
of the new approaches to sustainable development is the idea of integration. Systems approaches are 
increasmgly being recognized for their importance to the design of the regulatory, administrative, and 
legal structure for sustainable agriculture (Great Plains 1994). These same systems ideas extend as 
well to public sector activity in agriculture. It is with an integrated package of market incentives, 
institutions, policies, education, and other public sector activity that the opportunities for sustainable 
agriculture development are best realized. 
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The institutions and public policies that "surround" the private sector activity in agriculture can 
he drawn more tightly after the market reforms. Of course, neither the economic reforms nor the 
public sector and legal and regulatory framework can be expected to be a perfect "once-and-for-all 
policy." There will always be opportunity for change, reflecting new information, new technologies, 
and changing priorities of nations for environmental and agricultural performance. As the experience 
in implementing sustainable agricultural development deepens, it will likely become apparent that 
economic growth for agriculture and improved environmental performance are more consistent than 
may at first have been imagined. 
Transition to a Market System 
Essential to the development of a sustainable agriculture is an economic system that provides 
incentives for efficient use of resources, and the reduction of what might be called "policy 
uncertainty" for participants in the sector (Csaki and Johnson 1993). Each of these aspects of 
sustainable agriculture development is of particular importance for the transition economies. First, 
closing the gap between the economic systems of the past and the new market systems to which the 
nations are politically committed should be accomplished at a rapid pace. The expenence of the 
transition economies of the FSU suggests that the introduction of liberalized prices and other features 
of market economies without carrying through on the institutional and/or basic aspects of the structure 
that lead to successful functioning of markets can result in almost a "paralyzing" of agriculture 
(Lerman et al. 1994; Csaki and Johnson 1993). This is due to the inconsistency of incentives and the 
uncertainty about the course of the transition. If the participants in agriculture are not sure of the 
commitment to the market system and/or the pace of the reform, strategic behavior inconsistent with 
sustainabil ity may occur (McKinnon 1994). Clear communication on the course of the reform can 
result in improved agricultural productivity, more efficient resource use, and the establishment of the 
foundations for sustainable development. 
A number of lessons have been learned from the agricultural reform experience of the FSU 
nations and other nations in transition from planned to market economies (Csaki and Johnson 1993; 
Lerman 1994; McKinnon 1994). These lessons involve issues of pace, the order of liberalization, and 
the essential features of well functioning market systems. Selected lessons are reviewed in an order 
that reflects experience on the proper sequencing of market reforms. Actually, this order is not as 
important as it might at first appear. Successful transition requires concerted action in each of the 
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areas reviewed. References to synthesis pieces are included at various points. elaborating more fully 
on the experience to date with the transition efforts. 
Macroeconomic Stabilization and Price Liberalization 
A stable macroeconomic environment for producers and consumers is essential for success in the 
reform process (McKirmon 1991 a, 1991 b, 1994). Stabilization and financial balance with liberalized 
prices will require phasing-out producer and consumer subsidies. Generally, the macroeconomic 
balances of FSU countries in transition cannot be maintained without sharply reducing the producer 
and consumer subsidies associated with agriculture. Freer trade can help to establish prices and to 
guide resources toward uses more consistent with an open, free market economy. Opening borders 
and letting world prices signal transactions can help to "make markets" in transition economies. 
These nations also need capital investment and new technologies. Private capital will flow if prices 
are liberalized, trade is relatively free, and the monetary sphere is stable. With the foreign capital 
will come the new technologies necessary to make agriculture competitive in international markets. 
The reduction and restructuring of producer and consumer subsidies is, of course, difficult. But 
unless these subsidies are significantly reduced and restructured, there is little hope for 
macroeconomic stabilization, saving and domestic and foreign investment, and an orderly transition to 
a market system. Restructuring of the portion of the producer and consumer subsidies that remain in 
place is also an issue. In the formerly planned economies, subsidies were often implemented using 
artificial prices of goods and services, including credit. As a result, the subsidies were not well 
targeted to those most in "need." In market economies, there are often many subsidy programs, such 
as for the old and indigent or for those temporarily economically disadvantaged and in need of 
assistance. The economic issue is not whether societies should subsidize the at-risk groups. It 
concerns how the subsidies are delivered. In general, subsidies that distort prices and resource 
allocation are flawed in two ways: they are poorly targeted and they lead to inefficient resource use. 
Subsidies based on "means tests" and delivered to recipients using instruments that do not interfere in 
a major way with the market system are the least obstructive to successful economic reform. 
Demonopolization and Privatization 
Under planned systems, much of the processing and distribution, and even basic agriculture 
production, occurred under monopolistic conditions. Creating private monopolies by privatizing the 
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publicly owned ones is, of course, not the answer to efficient market reform. Privatization, or the 
transfer of property rights, will increase the opportunity of the private monopolists to benefit 
themselves at the expense of others. An accompanying anti-monopoly policy is also necessary. 
There are established approaches to controlling monopoly: opening borders to allow for competition 
by foreign firms, breaking up the large enterprises, or regulation. Most market economies have a 
monopoly policy that incorporates a combination of these approaches (Csaki and Johnson 1993: 
Williamson 1975). 
Often in privatization there is much concern about equitable initial asset distributions While an 
equal sharing of state assets among new private owners is a good way to avoid concentration of 
market power, which can lead to some kinds of market failures, not to distribute assets at all because 
of the difficulties of achieving perfect equity means no markets at all. It is better to divide assets as 
equitably as can reasonably be determined in a very short time. The markets will be able to function 
only when private agents have clear property rights under conditions that permit efficient transfers 
(sales/purchase/lease) of these rights between people. 
Furthermore, the temptation to control potential monopolies by maintaining partial state 
ownership should be avoided Partial state ownership is the least efficient way to curb the 
exploitation of private market power. The efficient way to avoid monopoly is to widen the 
opportunities for there to be many private owners and competitors. In contrast, state ownership 
narrows opportunities for new private firms by reducing incentives for foreign investment and new 
entry. Partial state ownership can even be a pro-monopoly policy because it increases the 
opportunities for corruption. 
Infrastructure and Efficient Markets 
Public acceptance of the market system will depend on efficiently functioning markets. Markets 
must function efficiently for both goods and services, for variable agricultural inputs, and for property 
or assets. For input and output markets, publicly supported information systems are a key for broad 
participation. Security of contracts is also critical to efficient exchange in markets. Various forms of 
arbitrage, buying and selling across regions and time, will improve the efficiency of the production 
and distribution system. This is not in nature a so-called "mafia activity," and is made such only if 
governments fail to recognize it as productive, or fail to expand it through an enabling regulatory and 
policy structure (Johnson 1993). A legal, administrative, and regulatory framework to insure 
enforceable contracts is the key responsibility of the government in market economies. Markets must 
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be opened to broad participation, be secure, and be perceived as fair. The fairness can be best 
accomplished through measures promoting symmetric information among participants. 
Government has a role in assuring that there is not unscrupulous behavior in markets. At the 
same time, the services provided by "middlemen" arbitrating between buyers and sellers should not be 
curtailed. These traders are providing productive services in the market system. The more valued 
the services of middlemen and the more scarce those willing to provide these services, the higher the 
"profit" to these middlemen. Thus, the most effective way to reduce the share of the middlemen's 
profits is through the opportunity to become middlemen. The larger the supply of these services, the 
lower the price any one middleman can require for his services. In market economies, warehousing, 
transport, handling, insuring, and retailing are important productive activities. In fact, the largest 
share of mature market economy GDP is generated in these so-called "service sectors." The most 
important role of the government in these markets is to assure conditions for broad participation. 
Markets must function as well for assets. Land markets, in particular, are critical to market 
reform. Again, the land resources must be easily transferable to the most productive users. The 
transfer costs, taxes and fees should be low, and registration and other government sanctions should 
ensure the validity of the contracts. Finally, much can be gained in establishing stable markets by 
linking (even if through t1riffs and border taxes) to international prices, and designing institutions to 
not discriminate against international participation in the production, processing, and distribution of 
agricultural commodities. This is especially the case for smaller FSU nations. If the intent is to 
integrate the domestic economy into the international markets, "marking" relative prices at 
international levels and phasing them in with transparent tariffs and trading systems can help to 
establish markets and improve resource allocation. 
Financial Markets and Credit 
Credit is the "lubricant" that supports agricultural production and the efficient functioning of 
market systems. In many FSU economies, credits are allocated from agricultural banks at 
concessionary rates. The continuation of this practice in market systems means that forms of 
"nonprice credit rationing" will emerge. That is, if credit is not allocated on the basis of interest 
rates, it must be rationed on another basis. This "other basis" can involve favoritism, cronyism, and 
in general allocation of scarce financial resources not consistent with their best use in agriculture. 
Privatization of land and other property or assets and bankruptcy law facilitate the use of equity, 
along with interest rates, in rationing the financing of agriculture production, processing, and 
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distribution. Creditors must have the option of legally forcing payment of loans that are in default if 
the private banking system is to succeed. 
The credit system and the banks must also be encouraged to secure savings as a source of capital 
and be transparent to their loan and savings customers. The latter is essential to insure that the 
suppliers of financial services are themselves financially solvent, and to limit market failure due to 
asymmetric information. There is an extensive literature on alternatives for regulating financial 
institutions that addresses this situation in transition economies. One important conclusion from this 
analysis is that the approach to regulation of private banks should be initially conservative, with great 
attention to savings protection and the limiting of bank failure (McKinnon 1991 a). 
Extension, Education, and Information 
The participants in transition economies must adapt rapidly to a new economic system. This 
suggests an important role for government in education, extension, and the supply of information 
services In many of the mature market economies, extension has been a key to the development of 
agriculture. Extension services supply tested research results and new information on technologies 
and management methods to participants in agriculture. Extension services also include information 
on improved business practices (Csaki and Johnson 1993). For example, good financial records are 
essential for firms to succeed in market systems. 
Public information on prices, new technologies, actions of the government, conditions in 
international markets, and many other aspects of the economy can assist firms in making better 
decisions. Since the benefits of supplying information and education are not fully appropriable, the 
private sector, left to its own, will underinvest in these services relative to the optimum for society. 
This is a clear example of "market failure," which can be effectively addressed by the newly 
configured public sector in transition economies. In short, active support of the participants in 
agriculture (the new private agents) and of agriculture markets is essential to consolidating benefits 
associated with a rapid economic transition. 
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Protecting Living Standards 
It is politically, and, from a humanitarian viewpoint, not possible to conduct market reform on 
the backs of the most economically disadvantaged citizens. The living standard protection in the old 
system was the guarantee of a job. In market systems, there will be unemployment, as resource use 
adjusts to the new incentive system and new business institutions. Two aspects of living standards 
protection merit specific comment. First, the households that are at risk must be assisted through the 
transition. Often, these households have become vulnerable due both to unemployment or 
underemployment and increasing food prices. Thus, agriculture is involved. 
The tendency of governments has been in many cases to hold staples prices artificially low as a way 
of providing a safety net. This is very costly because it does not target the at-risk populations. Also, 
it distorts the incentives that are often the most important subsectors in agriculture: those for staple 
foods. Targeted, means-tested, assistance programs are the answer. Principles for designing living 
standards protection policies follow directly from the modern theory of consumer demand (Deaton 
and Muellbauer 1984). 
Second, there is the issue of retraining or "restarting" individuals who are unemployed during the 
transition. Available idle human capital, if retooled and reintroduced into productive activity, can add 
to output and economic growth. Thus, retraining programs, jobs programs, and other initiatives that 
support the reentry of the unemployed or those who have become unproductive are part of a well-
balanced safety net program. This portion of the safety net is not an income transfer but an 
investment to yield more productive participants in the economic system. Rural sector population and 
the amount of labor in agriculture suggest that these policies will be particularly important to the 
transition and the sustainable development of agriculture (Stuart 1984). 
Rationalizing and Restructuring Government 
Particularly for agriculture and the rural sector in the FSU, public services were provided by 
enterprises and/or collective and state farms (Lerman eta!. 1994; Stuart 1984). Under the planned 
system, these enterprises were generally responsible for schooling, hospitals, roads, housing, 
pensions. and other services for rural populations. As these enterprises are privatized and 
restructured, there will be a natural tendency to shed their responsibility for supplying these public 
services. The enterprises will become more purely economic entities. Yet these public services are 
necessary if the quality of life in rural and urban areas is to be consistent. In general, supply of 
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public services requires local government. Local government in rural and urban communities must 
have taxation and other rights necessary to raise the funds to provide these public services These 
same government authorities must also learn to administer the public service programs efficiently. In 
some transition economies, the reluctance of the members of state and collective farms about 
restructuring has been related to uncertainties about the supply of traditional public services (Brooks 
and Lerman 1994). 
There are other new roles for government and the public sector in restructuring economies. But 
typically, in the economic sphere of activity, these involve adopting a different orientation. 
Government does not make things happen-markets and associated incentives do. Government must 
position itself to ensure the efficient functioning of markets. This requires new policies and 
institutions and a new attitude or policy culture for government sector leaders. Educational and other 
policies to actively change the policy culture of the bureaucracy can help to accelerate and consolidate 
the reform. Government bureaucrats often are the most resistant to change. 
Environmental Protection 
Enviromnental protection is a necessary element for sustainable agricultural development. As 
market prices for previously subsidized chemical and fertilizer inputs rise relative to output prices, the 
market sends incentives to use less of these chemicals and to use them more efficiently. Thus, market 
reforms have clear environmental benefits in terms of efficient use of chemicals and other variable 
inputs in agriculture production, processing, and distribution. But an additional comprehensive legal. 
administrative, and regulatory framework will be necessary to ensure that agriculture is not unduly 
harmful to the environment, and is sustainable. Generally, in more mature market economies. 
agricultural environmental policies are designed primarily to mitigate off-site damage. For example. 
erosion, contaminants in water and air, and noise and odor not only have an impact on production 
units, but also on the surrounding areas and property. Policies aimed at reducing the off-site impacts 
of agriculture for the environment typically involve combinations of regulation, education, and market 
incentives. The associated policy measures are rationalized on the basis of protecting human health 
and the general condition of the environment in the short run, and in the long run on the basis of a 
continued capacity to use resources in agriculture production and sustainability. In agriculture, unlike 
other sectors, the environment contaminants often come from nonpoint sources. Thus, pollutants do 
not simply come from the smokestack of a factory, but instead from applications of materials, tillage, 
or other practices on the overall landscape. This makes it difficult to monitor contamination and 
14 
environmental damage, and to enforce regulations designed to reduce this damage. For this reason, 
much of the environmental regulation of agriculture is educational and based on market incentive 
(Johnson and Martin 1993). 
A second feature of environmental regulation for agriculture in more mature market economies 
has been the development and use of "best practices" concepts. One way to be sure that the 
environment is not damaged is to eliminate hazardous practices from production activity However, 
as production occurs in different biological and geophysical circumstances, these standards or 
practices can be more restrictive than necessary. These concerns about the cost of environmental 
regulation are leading to different concepts of intervention. Instead of regulating by media using best 
practices, the idea is to regulate the integrated system; for example, the ecosystem. Indicators of 
performance of the ecosystem (perhaps a watershed for agriculture) in terms of environmental quality 
are identified. Then, through permit trading, siting, and other incentive-based systems, the agents in 
the system can organize themselves to meet the environmental performance standards. Regional 
environmental incentives in the United States, first organized around large bodies of water (lakes, 
rivers, and along coasts) were among the first to use this integrated-systems approach to 
environmental intervention on a large scale. 
Consistency in Reform 
As already mentioned, uncertainty about the course and pace of the policy reform is particularly 
debilitating for agriculture in transition economies. Agricultural production, processing, and 
distribution activities, by their very nature, have relatively long production periods and planning 
horizons. Annual cycles for crop production and investments in storage, livestock inventories, and 
processing facilities are examples. Because of the length of the production period and the necessity 
for agents in agriculture to anticipate the future in order to make effective current decisions, 
uncertainty about policy only adds yet another difficulty of transition. Of course, financial instability 
introduces uncertainty and adds complexity. But unpredictable reform packages are especially 
difficult for producers that organize their activities on a longer term basis. 
Partial regulation of output and input markets, threats of regulation of margins for processing and 
distribution, indicative prices, and other only partially visible instruments of the planned system 
and/or the reform package are among the policy factors that complicate decisions for agricultural 
agents More consistent reform packages that are implemented on a predictable timetable and that are 
transparent in their mechanisms and objectives are essential to sustainable agricultural development. 
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Partially enforced policies, stop-and-go actions, reversals of government reform initiatives, and lack 
of clarity about the intent of the policies or institutional measures and the nature of the instruments to 
be used for their implementation are major obstacles to sustainable agriculture development. Perhaps 
as important, the uneven course of the reform is particularly troublesome to foreign investors and 
other agents that are not in position to anticipate erratic policy change. 
Sustainability and the Environment 
Agricultural production simply cannot be sustained if the resource base is degenerating because 
of it. Thus, environmental protection and sustainable agricultural development are intertwined. 
Environmental protection is typically achieved through a package of legal, regulatory, and 
administrative measures, and more indirect governmental activities supporting education, monitoring, 
and the development of new technologies, market-based incentives, and public sector activity. 
We differentiate the other public sector activity from legal, regulatory, and administrative activities by 
noting that it can also provide goods and services: forest rangers, wildlife specialists, soil testing 
services, landscape design services, and managers of irrigation systems. These informational, 
indirect, environmental measures have already been discussed. The point was made that these 
activities contribute to protecting the environment and the resource base for agriculture, and can be 
introduced and proceed concurrently with economic reform. The reason is that these initiatives. albeit 
to differing extents, do not depend on the structure of agriculture that will emerge after the economic 
reform. 
Many of these indirect interventions that are designed to educate, monitor, and produce the new 
technology require skilled labor. This may be particularly fortunate as a way to deal with the 
necessary reductions in the public sector as a consequence of the reform. Much monitoring, 
education, surveying, and even demonstration activity can be accomplished at relatively low cost 
during the transition. Government workers, for example, the members of the agriculture 
administrations at regional levels, can reorient their activities and contribute positively to the 
sustainable development of agriculture and protection of the environment as educators and evaluators. 
The section "Transition to a Market Economy" included comment on the special features of the 
legal. regulatory, and administrative framework required for environmental protection and sustainable 
development of agriculture. These measures must deal with particular aspects of agriculture and the 
environment, off-site damage, nonpoint source contamination, extra-farm cooperation in managing 
ecosystems (e.g., watersheds) and the problems of enforcement (many private farmers distributed 
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over a large geographic area). In general, these features mean that environmental protection for 
agriculture will rely more heavily on education, incentives in the structure of subsidies (for example, 
partial payment for structures that provide both on- and off-farm benefit), and market incentives. 
Ideas of "integrated environmental management" are rapidly emerging in Western Europe and in the 
United States. The emphasis is on the "place" or the specifics of the particular location in designing 
packages of interventions to ensure environmental protection and at the same time permit growth and 
development of the local economy (Johnson and Martin 1993). 
One-time opportunities for environmental protection and the sustainable development of 
agriculture are mostly associated with property rights. Agriculture scientists in the formerly planned 
economies are well acquainted with frail environmental areas. These frail areas can be kept as public 
land and used on a fee basis (grazing rights, for example), targeted as areas where agricultural 
activity cannot be conducted, or titled with covenants or use restrictions. 
The term easement has become increasingly popular in environmental regulation of land use. If there 
are agricultural practices or activities that are particularly damaging to the environment, they can be 
restricted by covenants in land titles. Alternatively, easements can be purchased from the new land 
owners. These easements can limit use of selected production practices. If easements are purchased. 
markets can be organized to support the efficient supply of environmental benefits Easements are 
consistent with sustainable development of agriculture, since they are not unduly costly and specific 
targeting is possible. 
Finally, in the transition there are unique opportunities to influence the development of the rural 
landscape. Landscape design is receiving increased attention as a way to better link agriculture to 
improved environmental performance. In most regions, the landscape and land use patterns have 
developed historically. Thus, they reflect different technologies for production, transportation, 
processing, and distribution; and a different distribution of the population from what existed when 
agriculture developed. Also, more is now known about how agriculture affects the environment. 
This new information can be used to design improved landscapes for rural areas. These landscapes 
can, for example, incorporate patterns of forests, crop agriculture, and pastureland that are more 
consistent with the new technology and economic activity. Much of the land in the FSU nations has 
not yet been privatized. Opportunities exist for privatizing this land in a way that yields landscapes 
more consistent with modern agricultural technologies, modern transportation, current population 
densities and other factors important to agriculture, and up-to-date information on relationships 
between agriculture and the environment. These landscapes, whether consciously shaped by policy or 
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not in the future will provide the framework within which the sustainable development of agriculture 
will occur. 
Conclusions 
The policy and institutional framework that will guide agriculture after reform should be viewed, 
as much as possible, as an integrated package. This package must include not only private property 
and measures to ensure the efficient functioning of goods and asset markets, but also measures that 
will protect the agricultural resource base and the environment These are the pillars on which 
sustainable agricultural development will rest. It is convenient in considering this policy package to 
reflect on the available results on "industrial policy" (Johnson eta!. 1989; Johnson and Martin 1993; 
Adams and Klein 1983; Grossman 1990, for example). Industrial policies have been pursued for 
different sectors and by many nations. The lessons learned from industrial policy can be particularly 
valuable for agriculture. In general terms, the various industrial policies that have been tried can be 
placed into three categories: 
• Preservationist policies concerned with limiting change and/or restoring the sector to an 
earlier structure; 
• "Picking the winners" or government directing the course of economic development, 
technical change, or the structure of the industry; and 
• Transitional policies facilitating the movement of resources to productive uses in response to 
external drivers of change. 
What can be learned from the experience of many nations with differing industrial policies 
whether for agriculture or other sectors? First, preservationist policies almost never work. In the 
case of the transition economies, this means that attention to maintaining existing structures, 
production patterns, industry organization, and so on will require policies that are very unlikely to be 
maintained or to achieve the intended results. Once the political decision has been made to provide a 
different fundamental basis for organizing economic resources and production (a market system), it is 
highly unlikely that the old structure of agriculture will prevail. Accordingly, policies aimed at 
preserving past structure will be very costly in lost opportunities for sustainable development and 
growth, and will be short lived. 
On the "picking winners" strategy, the evidence is equally unimpressive. Generally, in market 
systems. governments cannot outperform the private sector in selecting directions of industry change 
and growth. Industry policies that involve heavy-handed government intervention in selecting, for 
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example, which subsectors of agriculture to develop and the ones not to develop, are likely to fail 
The point to remember is this: if the industry is to provide the goods and services people want, the 
market will signal all the right incentives. There is no need for a government to try to force it to 
happen. Instead of selecting the areas for agricultural development, the government should organize 
itself to facilitate these kinds of private sector decisions. 
Transitional industrial policies have been the most successful. In essence, these policies 
accelerate adjustments to new circumstances, new technologies, or new market opportunities. They 
arc very "light-handed" policies that often involve education, training, enabling institutions (for 
example. the German Standards Policy), and infrastructure. They also do not restrict the economic 
and civil rights of the population (Buchanan 1989; McMillan et a!. 1994; Scully 1992). This last 
pol!cy category seems most appropriate for sustainable agriculture in the transition economies, and on 
the has is of its record in other sectors and nations is most likely to succeed. 
The tie between environment and sustainable development of agriculture is the maintenance of 
the resource base (often defined as not foreclosing future opportunity for at least current production 
levels) Clearly, new technologies can compensate for degradation of the resource base, mamtaimng 
or improving productivity. But this is a gamble that responsible leaders are not likely to make. And 
there is evidence that this gamble has not worked in the planned systems (e.g., Johnson eta!. 1994: 
Skold and Popov 1990). Instead, investment in maintaining the quality of the resources used for 
agriculture as a form of saving is the wiser strategy. Investments can be viewed as present 
opportunity costs of limitations on the use of overly exploitive agriculture technologies. As 
sustainable development has become better understood, the research community in agriculture has 
directed added effort to new technologies that are more in harmony with maintaining and improving 
environmental quality. It is these new technologies to which informed leaders should give emphasis 
as keys to sustainable development in the longer run. In the shorter run, policies that place high 
priority on consolidating the market reform and nonintrusive environmental intervention are the ones 
destined to lead most expeditiously to the sustainable development of agriculture. 
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